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Non technical summary
This study joins the literature which investigates the empirical relevance of prominent
explanations for wage rigidity, such as contract theory, implicit contract theory, effi-
ciency wage theories, fair wage theory and insider-outsider theory. Our study extends
the existing literature by basing the findings on thorough econometric methods and a
more adequate, because larger and randomly selected, data set. In addition, we ana-
lyze the statistical correlation between various explanations for wage rigidity, be-
cause, say, two different explanations may by themselves provide a rationale for not
cutting wages on their own, but lose part of their explanatory power when both are
relevant. Furthermore we compare explanations for wage rigidity between Germany
and the United States, two countries with diverse labor market legislation.
While the economic rationale for wage rigidity may be independent of national legis-
lation, the relevance of each of these explanations may not. Depending on national
labor legislation the role of any of these explanations for wage rigidity may differ. The
bargaining power of employees and their unions will depend on employment protec-
tion, codetermination and collective wage bargaining legislation. Since German work-
ers enjoy a higher degree of employment protection than American workers do and
codetermination and collective bargaining is quite common in Germany, their bar-
gaining power might be higher, especially in collective wage bargaining rounds. Dif-
ferences in legislation may also indirectly influence the relevance of efficiency wage
explanations for wage rigidity, because more strict employment protection legislation
or a wider application of labor union contracts might impose more restrictions on
firms wage policies.
We surveyed 801 German firms and asked for their viewpoint with respect to the
relevance of various explanations for wage rigidity. Moreover, we compared our re-
sults with those obtained by Campbell and Kamlani (1997) for the United States, but
taking into account legal peculiarities of the German labor market system for wage
determination. German firms strongly support labor union contracts as an explanation
for wage rigidity for (less) skilled workers. Specific human capital and negative sig-
nals for new hires received strong support for highly skilled employees. Campbell
and Kamlani (1997) found the strongest support for the adverse selection model as
applied to quits for highly skilled white collar workers. This is not the case in our
study, which seems to be the consequence of stronger employment protection legis-
lation in Germany.
In both countries firms support implicit contract theory as an explanation for wage
rigidity for less skilled worker as well as turnover costs and a negative influence of
wage reduction on workers effort for all skill groups. Compared to the US-evidence,
insider-outsider behavior and labor union contracts are more relevant for the explana-
tion of wage rigidity from the viewpoint of German firms, which hints to the higher
degree of unionization in Germany compared to the United States. The German expe-
rience has some similarities with the Swedish (Agell and Bennmarker, 2002, Agell and
Lundborg, 2002), where unionization is even higher than in Germany. Despite the in-
fluence of labor market institutions and labor legislation, however, the economic ra-
tionale for wage rigidity has its own weight. The support from German and US firms
for explanations based on the impact of wages on effort and implicit contract theory
is not that different.
Different causes of wage rigidity are related to each other. There is a positive corre-
lation between labor union contracts and implicit contracts explanations for wage ri-
gidity for all skill groups. This finding suggests that workers’ desire for stable wages
is met in part by labor union contracts. There is also a relatively high correlation be-
tween five causes based on variants of efficiency wage theories. The findings suggest
that the contribution of an additional version of efficiency wages for explaining wage
rigidity is rather small, although each of the five causes received a high average score.
Furthermore, labor union contracts and efficiency wage explanations provide a ra-
tionale for wage rigidity on its own. Labor union contracts are no substitute for effi-
ciency wage explanations on wage rigidity and efficiency wage explanations provide
no substitute for implicit contracts. Each of these three basic theoretical explanations
contributes independently to the understanding of wage rigidity in firms.
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Abstract
The study provides evidence for the rationale of wage rigidity in Germany compared
to the United States. Based on a survey of 801 firms, we extend the study of Camp-
bell and Kanlani (1997, this journal) by using more thorough econometric methods,
for example, and find strong support for explanations based on labor union contracts
and implicit wages for Germany. Furthermore, survey respondents indicated that la-
bor union contracts and implicit contracts are important reasons for wage rigidity for
the (less) skilled. Specific human capital and negative signals for new hires are im-
portant reasons for the highly skilled. In contrast to the US experience for German
firms insider-outsider behavior, labor union contracts and specific human capital
seem to be more important explanations of wage rigidity.
21  Introduction
Despite high unemployment rates, firms in Germany as well as in other industrialized
countries seldom seem to cut wages even if they are not bound by negotiated wage
contracts. The same observation holds with respect to industry level wage bargaining
rounds in Germany. Negotiated wages, as a rule, never decline. In recessions, hours
reduction and workers displacement are more common adjustment mechanisms
rather than wage reductions. The question is why societies afford the luxury of wage
rigidity, given the significant costs of unemployment.1
Several studies try to shed light on the relevance of theoretical explanations for the
reasons of wage rigidity.2 A special branch of these attempts contributes to the lit-
erature by asking firms why they behave the way they do (Table I).3 These studies
indicate that economic theory provides sound explanations for wage rigidity, among
them efficiency wage theories, contract and implicit contracts theory and fairness
theory.
Note, however, that sample sizes in most of these studies are rather small and often
not representative for firms in question. Furthermore, information concerning the
type of labor contracts is rare. Kaufman (1984) interviewed 26 small firms in Britain,
Blinder and Choi (1990) 19 large firms in New Jersey and Eastern Pennsylvania.
Campbell and Kamlani (1997) focus on five prominent explanations of wage rigidity
(contract theory, implicit contract theory, efficiency wage theories, fair wage theory
and insider-outsider theory) and introduced three skill categories of labor. Their
study is based on a survey of 184 mainly large US firms. Agell and Lundborg (1995,
2002) surveyed 159 relatively large unionized firms from the Swedish manufacturing
sector in 1991 and again in 1998. In a further study, Agell and Bennmarker (2002)
interviewed 885 representatively selected Swedish firms in 1999. Bewley (1995, 1998,
1999) interviewed 335 business and union leaders, counselors of unemployed per-
sons and business consultants in the Northeast of the United States. The latter sam-
                                       
1 Bertola (1999) compares employment, unemployment and wage dynamics in a number of industrialized
countries, among them Germany and the United States. On the aggregate level real wages in Germany
increased considerably in the last forty years. There was only moderate employment growth. In the
United States, there was a significant rise in employment accompanied by a moderate rise in real wages.
2 See Bewley (1999), Malcomson (1999) and Howitt (2002) for recent comprehensive discussions of
empirical and theoretical work on wage rigidity.
3 Recent evidence on the existence of nominal wage rigidity based on individual workers pay histories is
provided by Altonji and Devereux (1999), Card and Hyslop (1997) and Kahn (1997) for the United
States, Beissinger and Knoppik (2001) for Germany and Fehr and Götte (2000) for Switzerland,
among others.
3ple was obtained by net working and not by random sampling strategies. Moreover,
due to differences in the questionnaires and the research methods used, the findings
are not easily comparable between those studies.
Our study comes closest to the methodology employed by Campbell and Kamlani
(1997) but extends their work in several important ways. Firstly, while the design of
our questionnaire deliberately also contains the questions, among others, raised by
these authors, in order to allow a direct comparison, we base our findings on thor-
ough econometric methods and a more adequate, because larger and randomly se-
lected (like Agell and Bennmarker (2002), which has been conducted also in 1999),
data set. In our study the influence of firm specific factors and labor contracts on the
assessment of different explanations of wage rigidity is tested using multivariate or-
dered probit models rather than by bivariate t-tests. Moreover, we analyze the statis-
tical correlation between different explanations for wage rigidity. While Campbell and
Kamlani (1997) asked firms to indicate the most important statement for explaining
wage rigidity our correlation analyses offer an attempt to study the relationship be-
tween different explanations. This aspect seems important because, say, efficiency
wage theories and contract theory may by themselves provide a rationale for not cut-
ting wages on their own, but if firms view labor union contracts as an important ex-
planation for wage rigidity, efficiency wages may, from the viewpoint of firms, lose
part of their explanatory power. Whether that is the case or not, is an empirical ques-
tion, which is investigated in our study. Secondly, although firms in Germany and the
U.S. share many common interests and belong to roughly comparable economic en-
vironments, they differ remarkably in their assessment of the causes of wage rigidity.
As has been pointed out, e.g. by Howitt (2002), alternative explanations for wage
stickiness are central to the great macroeconomic debates. As a prerequisite for con-
structing macroeconomic models, an understanding of the forces which prevent la-
bor markets from clearing is essential.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the German survey and some
peculiarities of the structure of wage contracts. Section III discusses firm responses
with respect to distinct explanations of wage rigidity and compares the results with
the ones found by Campbell and Kamlani (1997) for the United States. Section IV
highlights the relationship between firm support for each of the statements on wage
rigidity. Section V investigates the issue of pay differentiation in labor union con-
tracts. In section VI we present our conclusions.
42 Overview of the German survey and                                  the
structure of contracts
Between February and April 2000, 801 firms responded to a standardized written
questionnaire which was sent to the head of the human resources department of
5,158 firms (each with more than 9 employees) from the following industries: chemi-
cal; metal, electrical goods industry and machinery; wholesale and retail trade; finance
and insurance; firm related services and other sectors. Firms were selected randomly
from about 160,000 firms operating in these industries. Details of the sample design
are relegated to the Appendix. The response rate was 15.5 percent and item response
is high.
Table II contains descriptive statistics about the sample population and the respective
population of all firms. To begin with, firms which apply union labor contracts are
somewhat overrepresented in the sample (75 percent versus 40 percent) and repre-
sent around 70 percent of sample employees. Either these firms are covered by in-
dustry level bargaining, i.e. they are members of the bargaining employer association,
or, to a much lesser amount (10 percent) they apply union labor contracts on a vol-
untary basis, in order to avoid costs associated with wage bargaining, for example.
Be that as it may, application of union labor contracts rises with firm size. To be
covered by collective bargaining does not necessarily mean, however, that wage de-
termination at the firm level is absent. In 83 percent of the firms wages are bargained
between employer and workers either as an alternative or in addition to labor union
contracts. Both elements, industry level and individual firm level wage bargaining, can
be observed frequently at the same firm.
Taken together, there is a stronger emphasis on industry level wage bargaining in
Germany compared to the United States. Although firms covered by industry level
bargaining are not forced legally to pay their non-union workforce wages as high as
negotiated, as a rule, most firms do so for obvious reasons (e.g. otherwise the em-
ployees would join the union). Around 87 and 80 percent, respectively, of the survey
firms with labor union contracts responded that they had no factories where labor
union contracts were not applied and that their pay schemes did not differ between
5union and non union workers (Table II).4 These figures differ remarkably from those
in the United States according to Campbell and Kamlani (1997).5
The causes of wage rigidity may be subject to firm heterogeneity as has been empha-
sized by Bewley (1999). Hence, the survey tries to capture essential parts of such
heterogeneity. The reasons for wage rigidity might differ between firms with and
without labor union contracts as well as with respect to industry affiliation, firm size,
skill level of the workforce, regional location of the (headquarter of the) firm and
whether firms have difficulties recruiting new staff, pointing to the labor market situa-
tion as an influence of firms responses. Analogous to Campbell and Kamlani (1997)
we distinguish three broad skill categories – highly skilled, skilled and less skilled.
Less skilled are defined as workers without a formal occupational degree, skilled are
workers who have been certified by the German Dual Vocational Training System,
and highly skilled are workers with a degree from a university or a technical univer-
sity. While the categories are the same in both studies, their definitions differ because
those used in this study are better suited to the German educational system. For ex-
ample, in contrast to the United States the majority of blue-collar workers in Germany
have been educated in the German Dual Vocational Training System and should be
categorized as being skilled workers. Hence, in the German survey the share of
skilled workers is higher than in the U.S.. The industrial composition between both
countries is similar with respect to manufacturing and trade. In the German survey,
however, there are more firms belonging to the firm-related service sector, and less
firms belonging to finance, insurance, and construction. Finally, in Germany, average
firm size is smaller.
3 Explanations for wage rigidity by German and US-firms
Firms were given nine statements based on various theories of wage rigidity as in
Campbell and Kamlani (1997, part III).6 The introductory statement was: “Even in
economically bad times or in times of high unemployment firms seldom reduce
                                       
4 From a legal point of view, firms with labor union contracts have to apply them only to members of the
bargaining union. 30 percent of the workforce population in Germany is a member of a union (Franz
(1999) p. 242).
5 According to Campbell and Kamlani (1997, Footnote 1), 12.3 percent of workers in the United States
are represented by labor unions. In their sample 14.7 percent of the firms are unionized. Although union
membership declined in Germany (see Franz (1999) p. 242 ff.) as well as in the United States and
Great Britain (see Acemoglu et al. (2001)) the application of labor union contracts in Germany is rather
stable. For example: in the finance and insurance industries only 14 percent of workers are unionized;
however, 70 percent of the firms apply the labor union contracts to almost all relevant workers.
6 The questionnaire is available on request.
6workers pay, although that may help them to survive and save working places. Please
assess the following explanations as ‘not important’, ‘of minor importance’, ‘moder-
ately important’ or ‘very important’. Respondents were asked to assess the state-
ments for each of the three worker categories separately.
Table III reports the frequency distribution of the responses for the nine statements,
two values of the average scores – one for the sample and one for the population of
firms (under the assumption of random response) and the average scores from
Campbell and Kamlani (1997, Table IV). The responses to statement a (labor union
contracts) are reported separately for the groups of firms with labor union contracts.
In order to allow for comparison with Campbell and Kamlani (1997), the four re-
sponses were converted into numerical scores 1 (not important), 2 (of minor impor-
tance), 3 (moderately important) and 4 (very important). An average score over 2.5 is
considered as strong and an average over 3.0 as very strong support (see Blinder
(1990)). In addition, Table III reports the whole frequency distribution of results. For
example, statement a (emphasizing labor union contracts as a reason for wage rigid-
ity) received the highest score for less skilled workers. Nevertheless, for some 19
percent of survey firms applying labor union contracts, negotiated wages were unim-
portant or of minor importance for the explanation of wage rigidity. The significance
of firm characteristics is tested with multivariate ordered probit models. Summary
results are reported in Table V. This methodology may document the relevance of
firm characteristics more appropriately than bivariate t-tests of scores as in Campbell
and Kamlani (1997), given the numerical conversions of qualitative statements and a
possible presence of multicollinearity.
Firms in Germany and in the United States share common views but differ in others.
In both countries the reasons for wage rigidity differ between skill groups. In Ger-
many statement a (labor union contracts) and b (implicit contracts) received (very)
strong support for less and medium skilled workers, but for many more German re-
spondents labor union contracts are a (very) important reason for wage rigidity.7 This
points to the role of collective wage bargaining legislation in Germany.
For highly skilled workers statements c (negative signals), e (fluctuation costs) and h
(specific human capital) received very strong support. There is also strong support
for statement e and h for skilled workers. Fluctuation costs therefore provide an im-
portant explanation for wage rigidity for skilled labor.8
                                       
7 This confirms Swedish evidence (Agell and Lundborg (1995, 2002), Agell and Bennmarker (2002)).
8 In large German industrial firms the costs of training in specific human capital can represent up to a one
year salary (Franz and Soskice (1995))
7Statement d emphasizes the effect of wages on effort. In Germany this statement re-
ceives strong support for all skilled groups, while the values of the scores are rather
similar. Campbell and Kamlani (1997) found a higher support for less-skilled and
blue-collar workers. The responses to statement b on implicit contracts and to e on
the relevance of fluctuation costs are very similar in both surveys. This points to the
relevance of implicit contracts, of wage related effort variation and fluctuation costs
for wage rigidity, despite different degrees of centralization in wage determination in
both countries.
Major differences concern the effect of wages on quits and new hires. In the United
States statement g (adverse selection model applied to quits) received the strongest
support for all skill groups. While responses did not differ much between skilled
groups in the German survey, either, the average scores are lower and do not exceed
those for the support for explanations based on the effect of wages on effort. One
possible explanation for these differences may be due to employment protection leg-
islation. According to the German laws social aspects have to be taken into account
in sorting out people to be dismissed. Therefore it might be more difficult to dismiss
the least productive workers. Firms in the United States can put less emphasis on
social aspects.
Further differences seem to exist in the responses to statement i (workers’ resenti-
ments). A possible explanation for the stronger support for statement i in Germany
rests on codetermination and collective wage bargaining legislation in Germany. Be-
cause of these specific workers’ rights, the motive for conflict avoidance may be
more relevant in Germany. This finding does not necessarily contradict the assump-
tion of profit maximizing behavior, but indicates more severe constraints, stemming
from labor laws, on firm behavior in Germany.
A final difference is related to statement c which emphazises the effect of wages on
new hires, which finds much stronger support in Germany. One possible explanation
is that in Germany information on wages and the wage structure is more transparent
and ready available due to the broader application of labor union contracts. There-
fore, German firms might be somewhat more concerned with negative signal effects
stemming from wage cuts which undermine their attractiveness for skilled labor. Pre-
sumably this is reinforced by the more compressed wage structure in Germany.9 The
stronger support for statement f (insider-outsider theory) may confirm the view that
the insider–outsider theory provides a rationale for collective action rather than a ra-
tionale for individual behavior (Fehr (1990)) and is in line with the result for the
                                       
9 See Blau and Kahn (1999) and Fitzenberger (1999).
8United States that a much stronger support for statement f is found in unionized
firms.
To shed some more light on the relevance of the insider-outsider-theory, respondents
were asked whether workers would agree upon “pay moderation” either ”for keeping
their own working place” or “for creating additional working places”. Respondents
were given three categories of responses: yes, no, and not known for certain. Table
IV reports the results. The message is impressive: While, in the opinion of employ-
ers, a majority of workers would comply with lower pay in order to secure their own
working place, but very few workers in order to create additional employment. These
results, together with the support for statement f (harassment), provide support for
insider-outsider mechanism in Germany.
To test the relevance of firm characteristics for the responses, ordered probit models
for each statement were estimated. Table V reports whether a variable has proved to
be significantly different from zero at the five percent level in the ordered probit
model. In the case of a significant coefficient Table V reports +, and otherwise -.
Firm characteristics play a significant role in respondents’ support of some but not
all statements on wage rigidity as indicated also by the bivariate tests by Campbell
and Kamlani (1997) and Agell and Lundborg (1995, 2002).10 Firms joining the bar-
gaining employers’ association significantly more often support statement a, which
emphasizes the relevance of labor union contracts for wage rigidity. There is no dif-
ference between those firms which voluntarily apply these contracts and those which
do not at all apply (the reference category).
Turning to the relevance of efficiency wage considerations, there is further evidence
that the application of labor union contracts affects the support for statement e (ad-
verse selection in quits; for (less) skilled workers), d (negative effort variation; for
less skilled workers), h (specific human capital; for highly skilled workers) and g
(adverse selection in dismissals; for skilled workers). Because all these statements
rely on efficiency wages as a reason for wage rigidity, the findings seem to indicate
that individual firms participating in the system of central wage bargaining do not fear
that wage reductions lead to more quits, higher fluctuation costs, and the like. Since
lowering wages in labor union contracts would apply to all of these firms, its specific
impact on an individual firm is not that important.
                                       
10 In addition to the firm characteristics reported in Table V, we tested the influence of the skill structure,
profit expectations in 2000 compared to 1998/1999 and the share of flexible pay components. How-
ever, we could not find any evidence for the relevance of these variables.
9Those firms who report recruitment difficulties for skilled labor, support efficiency
wage models with a higher probability, thereby reducing the room for wage cuts for
the workers employed. Smaller firms have significantly less fear that wage reduction
leads to higher fluctuation costs for highly skilled workers (statement e) and has a
higher probability of supporting statement h (specific human capital) for medium and
highly skilled labor. Therefore, in these firms specific human capital aspects seem to
dominate the role of transaction costs as a reason for wage rigidity.
There are significant industry, firm size and regional effects for some statements.
With the exception of statement e (fluctuation costs) for the highly skilled there are
no important firm size effects. The existence of workers councils reduces the sup-
port for the explanations emphasizing the effect of wages on effort (statement d), of
wages on fluctuation (statement e) and of wages for new hires (statement c). The ab-
sence of any measurable effect of workers’ councils on the explanation of wage ri-
gidity for highly skilled workers stems from the fact that, as a rule, these workers are
not represented by workers councils. In summing up, the following explanations for
wage rigidity put forward by economic theory are approved by survey respondents:
In both countries firms support implicit contract theory as an explanation for wage
rigidity for less skilled worker as well as turnover costs and a negative influence of
wage reduction on workers effort for all skill groups. Major differences between
firms in Germany and the United States concern insider-outsider behavior, labor un-
ion contracts, and explanations based on specific human capital and adverse selec-
tion considerations.
4 The relationship between the statements on wage rigidity
Each theory may, in principle, provide a possible explanation for wage rigidity, but,
different theories might be complements or substitutes in practice. Wage rigidity re-
sulting from labor union contracts may be observed even in the absence of such
contracts because of the existence of unobservable implicit contracts. Various effi-
ciency wage arguments may together raise explanatory power than one specific effi-
ciency wage theory alone, compared to insider–outsider considerations, for example.
If respondents support two statements, a positive relationship between firm re-
sponses would indicate that the influence of one of these two statements may, in fact,
be small. Otherwise, if there is no measurable relationship between two statements,
each of the two theories behind the statement has its own power in explaining wage
rigidity. Finally, a negative relationship indicates that more support for one statement
reduces the support for the other. In those cases the two theories may not be relevant
at the same time.
While Campbell and Kamlani (1997) only asked firms to indicate the most important
statement for explaining wage rigidity, our correlation analysis provides an attempt to
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study the relationships between different explanations. Respondents were asked
about their view on nine statements for three worker groups. Taken together one ob-
tains 351 possible bivariate relations, which are quantified with Goodman’s and
Kruskal’s g. This measure of correlation takes into account the ordered nature of the
responses. It varies between minus and plus one. For example, a value of 0.7 implies
that from 100 firms which give full support for a specific statement, 70 firms do so
for another statement, too. For practical reasons and space restrictions, table VI re-
ports 27 correlation values between the worker categories for each statement and 108
correlation values between the statements for each worker group.11
The following findings deserve attention. Firstly, there is a skill specific pattern with
respect to the reason of wage rigidity (part 1 of table VI). The reasons for wage ri-
gidity are very similar between skilled and highly skilled labor for all nine statements,
and fairly similar for medium and less skilled labor. While the correlation between
less and highly skilled labor is also significant, the numerical values, with the only ex-
ceptions of statement i and f, are lower. Secondly, the five statements emphasizing
different versions of efficiency wages (statement c, d, e, g and h) are positively cor-
related for all worker categories, with relatively high numerical values. These findings
suggest that the contribution of an additional version of efficiency wages for explain-
ing wage rigidity seems to be rather small, although each of the five statements re-
ceives a high average score. Thirdly, there is a positive correlation between labor un-
ion contracts and implicit contracts explanations for wage rigidity for all skill groups.
This finding suggests that workers’ desire for stable wages is met in part by labor
union contracts. Fourthly, there is mixed evidence on the correlation between labor
union contracts and statements based on efficiency wages. This suggests that labor
union contracts as well as efficiency wages provide a rationale for wage rigidity on its
own. Labor union contracts seem to be no substitute for efficiency wages.  The same
seems to be true for the relationship between implicit contracts and efficiency wages.
Although there are some positive values of correlation between efficiency wage and
implicit contract explanations, the numerical values are rather small. Hence, each of
these three basic theoretical explanations contribute independently to the under-
standing of wage rigidity. Fifthly, insider-outsider theory and conflict avoidance as
possible explanations of wage rigidity are positively correlated with each other and
with the efficiency wage explanations. The additional explanatory power of these two
                                       
11The other values deal with correlation between a statement for skill group A and another statement for
skill group B. It is well known that labor demand between skill groups is not independent from each
other, see Hamermesh (1993). Wage rigidity in the group of less skilled might enhance the demand for
skilled labor if these two types of skills are substitutes. Despite its importance for policy reasons we are
not aware of any study, which links skill specific explanations of wage rigidity and skill specific labor
demand.
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theories, given the efficiency explanations, is lower compared to its average and un-
conditional explanatory power as measured by the average score. But to some extent
these findings confirm the relevance of fluctuation costs, specific human capital and
wage related effort variation for the bargaining power of insiders and the conflict
avoidance strategy by firms.
5 Pay differentials in labor union contracts
According to survey respondents, labor union contracts are an important reason for
wage rigidity in Germany. Firms applying such contracts are asked, whether they plan
to escape from industry level wage bargaining. 85 percent of survey respondents had
no plans in that direction. From the remaining firms 39 percent planned to withdraw
membership of the employer association, 24 percent planned to outsource parts of
the production and 25 planned to bargain directly with the union. From these answers
it seems reasonable to conclude that there is some limited pressure on labor union
contracts possibly caused by the wage rigidity induced by negotiated wages. This
may be the reason for the observed trend on negotiating more flexible pay structures
in the annual bargaining rounds since some years. Labor union contracts nowadays
more often contain hardship clauses and the possibility for lower pay for new hires
and long termed unemployed persons. Whether there exist such possibilities for pay
differentiation in labor union contracts and, if so, to what extent firms, applying labor
union contracts, take advantage of this flexibility is reported in table VI which con-
tains the questions and the distribution of answers of respondents on hardship
clauses, reduced pay for new hires, and reduced pay for long-term unemployed.
Only 11 to 15 percent of the respondents confirm the existence of these flexible pay
structures in labor union contracts, which is not that much. Surprisingly, however,
the majority of firms which can take advantage pay differentiation do not make use of
it. There are two possible explanations for that finding. Firstly, at the time the survey
was taken (1999) Germany was not in an economy wide recession, hence there was
no urgent need for applying the hardship clause. Secondly, differentiated pay with
respect to new hires and long term unemployed may be considered as being unfair, a
result which has been found also by Campbell and Kamlani (1997), Bewley (1999)
and Agell and Lundborg (2002). As a result of our survey the overwhelming share of
firms which did not take advantage of differentiated pay, answered that there was no
economic necessity to do and only a minority feared disadvantages on the labor mar-
ket (multiple answers were possible). This results holds for hardship clauses as well
as for differentiated pay for new hires and/or for long-term unemployed. Since the
number of respondents for these questions is rather small the results should be taken
with some caution. Nevertheless, they are in line with the adverse selection model as
applied to new hires and the relevance of fairness considerations in pay determina-
tion.
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6 Conclusions
This study joins the literature which investigates the empirical relevance of prominent
explanations for wage rigidity, such as contract theory, implicit contract theory, effi-
ciency wage theories, fair wage theory and insider-outsider theory. Our study extends
the existing literature by basing the findings on thorough econometric methods and a
more adequate, because larger and randomly selected, data set. In addition, we ana-
lyze the statistical correlation between various explanations for wage rigidity, be-
cause, say, two different explanations may by themselves provide a rationale for not
cutting wages on their own, but lose part of their explanatory power when both are
relevant. Furthermore we compare explanations for wage rigidity between Germany
and the United States, two countries with diverse labor market legislation.
While the economic rationale for wage rigidity may be independent of national legis-
lation, the relevance of each of these explanations may not. Depending on national
labor legislation the role of any of these explanations for wage rigidity may differ. The
bargaining power of employees and their unions will depend on employment protec-
tion, codetermination and collective wage bargaining legislation. Since German work-
ers enjoy a higher degree of employment protection than American workers do and
codetermination and collective bargaining is quite common in Germany, their bar-
gaining power might be higher, especially in collective wage bargaining rounds. Dif-
ferences in legislation may also indirectly influence the relevance of efficiency wage
explanations for wage rigidity, because more strict employment protection legislation
or a wider application of labor union contracts might impose more restrictions on
firms wage policies.
We surveyed 801 German firms and asked for their viewpoint with respect to the
relevance of various explanations for wage rigidity. Moreover, we compared our re-
sults with those obtained by Campbell and Kamlani (1997) for the United States, but
taking into account legal peculiarities of the German labor market system for wage
determination. German firms strongly support labor union contracts as an explanation
for wage rigidity for (less) skilled workers. Specific human capital and negative sig-
nals for new hires received strong support for highly skilled employees. Campbell
and Kamlani (1997) found the strongest support for the adverse selection model as
applied to quits for highly skilled white collar workers. This is not the case in our
study, which seems to be the consequence of stronger employment protection legis-
lation in Germany.
In both countries firms support implicit contract theory as an explanation for wage
rigidity for less skilled worker as well as turnover costs and a negative influence of
wage reduction on workers effort for all skill groups. Compared to the US-evidence,
insider-outsider behavior and labor union contracts are more relevant for the explana-
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tion of wage rigidity from the viewpoint of German firms, which hints to the higher
degree of unionization in Germany compared to the United States. The German expe-
rience has some similarities with the Swedish (Agell and Bennmarker, 2002, Agell and
Lundborg, 2002), where unionization is even higher than in Germany. Despite the in-
fluence of labor market institutions and labor legislation, however, the economic ra-
tionale for wage rigidity has its own weight. The support from German and US firms
for explanations based on the impact of wages on effort and implicit contract theory
is not that different.
Different causes of wage rigidity are related to each other. There is a positive correla-
tion between labor union contracts and implicit contracts explanations for wage ri-
gidity for all skill groups. This finding suggests that workers’ desire for stable wages
is met in part by labor union contracts. There is also a relatively high correlation be-
tween five causes based on variants of efficiency wage theories. The findings suggest
that the contribution of an additional version of efficiency wages for explaining wage
rigidity is rather small, although each of the five causes received a high average score.
Furthermore, labor union contracts and efficiency wage explanations provide a ra-
tionale for wage rigidity on its own. Labor union contracts are no substitute for effi-
ciency wage explanations on wage rigidity and efficiency wage explanations provide
no substitute for implicit contracts. Each of these three basic theoretical explanations
contributes independently to the understanding of wage rigidity.
Appendix
The present study uses a large firm address data base at the  Center for European
Economic Research (ZEW), Mannheim Germany. The data base is an original data
set established by a German credit rating association (Verband der Vereine Creditre-
form (VVC)) that has been widely used by economists (see for example Harhoff,
Stahl and Woywode, 1998). These data set contains information on firm size and
industry of the most important activities of the firm. In the industries selected for the
purpose of the current study the data base contained the addresses of 160,607 firms
with more than 9 employees in December 1999. The industries chosen represent
manufacturing and service industries and firms from the sector of firm related serv-
ices. From these addresses 5,100 were selected randomly on the basis of a two way
stratification scheme by five industries and six firm size categories.
Larger firms and firms in chemical and finance and insurance were oversampled to
get a reasonable number of responses in these cells. Table VIII contains the number
of randomly selected firms in each industry and firm size cell, their share in the po-
pulation and the number of respondents. Under the assumption of random response
weight factors had been calculated for inferences about the original firm population.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Variable (Type of Variables) Sample mean Population
meana
Observationsb
Percentages Percentages
Legal background for a labor union contract (0, 1)
No labor union contract (reference cat.) 43.0 62.0 797
Membership in the employer association 39.5 22.5 797
Firm specific labor union contract 4.1 2.1 797
Governmental binding union contract wages c 3.9 3.4 797
Reference clause in individual contracts 2.4 1.4 797
Voluntary application 7.0 8.6 797
Only for firms applying a labor union contract
Are there plants without application?(0
no,1yes)
12.3 12.6 454
Are there pay differences between union and
non union members? (0 no,1 yes)
20.1 20.6 393
Skill composition of workers (in percent)
Highly skilled workers 21.9 19.8 683
Skilled workers 60.1 67.4 683
Less skilled workers 18.0 12.8 683
Industrial composition (0, 1)
Chemical (reference cat.) 12.6 2.3 801
Metal- and engine building, electrical industries 29.5 23.4 801
Wholesale and retail trade 15.9 43.2 801
Finance and insurance 11.0 1.6 801
Firm related services 27.6 25.2 801
Others (construction, etc.) 3.5 4.3 801
20
Table 2 Continue
Number of employees (firm size categories, 0, 1)
500+ employees (reference cat.) 22.4 3.1 799
200- 499 17.3 4.0 799
100-199 16.5 5.9 799
50- 99 15.3 11.3 799
20-49 14.0 26.7 799
10-19 14.5 49.0 799
Location of firms´ headquarter (0, 1)
West Germany (reference cat.) 73.1 73.8 789
East Germany 17.2 20.3 789
Outside Germany 9.6 5.9 789
There is a workers´ council in the firm (0, 1)
Workers´ council 52.6 18.4 794
Evidence of recruitment problems for highly skilled workers (0, 1)
No evidence (reference cat.) 58.6 69.7 753
Evidence 23.1 12.0 753
Strong evidence 18.3 18.6 753
Evidence of recruitment problems for skilled workers (0, 1)
No evidence (reference cat.) 48.1 45.9 772
Evidence 29.9 29.6 772
Strong evidence 22.0 24.5 772
a Mean calculated for the population of firms under the assumption of random response.
b Number of valid observations for the variable under consideration.
c „Allgemeinverbindlicherklärung“, i.e. all firms in a region and industry have to apply the labor union con-
tracts of that region and industry.
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Table 4: Pay moderation and job security
Response category Yes No Not sure Number of
valid observa-
tions
Percentages
„Do you think that the workers in your firm would accept more moderate pay
 to secure their own working place?“
Highly skilled 38.6 23.3 38.1 776
Skilled 42.3 27.7 30.0 788
Less skilled 34.4 34.4 31.2 765
„Do you think that the workers in your firm would accept more moderate pay
to create additional working places?“
Highly skilled 7.2 67.3 25.4 770
Skilled 5.8 69.3 24.9 778
Less skilled 3.6 74.9 21.5 755
Calculations are based on the assumption of random response.
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Table 5: Significant influences on firms support for each explanation on wage
rigidity
Statement a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i.
Skill group H S L H S L H S L H S L H S L H S L H S L H S L H S L
Legal background for a labor union contract (reference cat.: no labor union contract)
Membership
empl.ass. + + + - -
Firm specific con-
tract + + + - - -
Legally binding + +
Reference clause
Voluntary applica-
tion
Industries (reference cat.: chemical)
Metal-, electrical
ind. + + + +
Trade + -
Finance and in-
surace + + + + + + + - -
Firm related serv-
ices + + + + + +
Others (construc-
tion, etc.) -
Firm size (reference cat.: 500+)
10-19 employees - + +
20-49 + - - - - -
50- 99
100-199 - -
200- 499 -
Location of firms´ headquarter (reference cat.: West Germany)
East Germany - -
Outside Germany - -
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Table 5 Continue
There is a workers´ council in the firm (reference cat.: no workers´ council)
Workers´ council - - - -
Evidence of recruitment problems for highly skilled (reference cat.: no evidence)
Evidence - - -
Strong evidence + + + -
Evidence of recruitment problems for skilled (reference cat.: no evidence)
Evidence + + + + +
Strong evidence + + + + + + + + + + +
Significance a + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
+ / - a positive / negative coefficient of one variable was different from zero at the 5 percent level in an
ordered probit model.
a The significance of all explanatory variables in the ordered probit model was tested based on a likeli-
hood ratio test, + indicates that all explanatory variables together are significant at the 5 percent level.
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Table 6: Correlation analysis
Part 1: Correlation between the skill groups for each statement (?)  a
Statement L - S L – H S - H
a. 0.65 0.33 0.88
b. 0.75 0.23 0.81
c. 0.72 0.25 0.85
d. 0.72 0.38 0.93
e. 0.72 0.37 0.88
f. 0.83 0.60 0.93
g. 0.79 0.56 0.96
h. 0.70 0.24 0.91
i. 0.88 0.74 0.96
Part 2: Correlation between statements for each skill group (?)  a
Less skilled workers (L)
Statement b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i.
a. 0.27 -0.04 0.15 0.10 0.08 0.19 -0.13 0.01
b. --- 0.12 0.23 0.16 0.13 0.06 0.19 0.13
c. --- 0.47 0.53 0.10 0.26 0.50 0.22
d. --- 0.55 0.27 0.43 0.42 0.44
e. --- 0.20 0.29 0.48 0.20
f. --- 0.38 0.22 0.10
g. --- 0.33 0.16
h. --- 0.24
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 Table 6 Continue
Skilled workers (S)
Statement b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i.
a. 0.36 -0.04 0.04 -0.01 0.09 0.19 0.08 -0.04
b. --- -0.01 0.13 0.14 0.07 0.19 0.16 0.28
c. --- 0.58 0.54 0.14 0.19 0.38 0.32
d. --- 0.59 0.17 0.34 0.60 0.36
e. --- -0.01 0.39 0.56 0.31
f. --- 0.30 0.32 0.21
g. --- 0.41 0.11
h. --- 0.37
Highly skilled workers (H)
Statement b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i.
a. 0.27 0.04 0.12 -0.13 0.12 0.10 -0.04 0.04
b. --- 0.09 0.11 0.05 0.18 0.23 0.09 0.24
c. --- 0.47 0.51 0.19 0.21 0.42 0.32
d. --- 0.51 0.18 0.33 0.45 0.24
e. --- 0.13 0.30 0.58 0.23
f. --- 0.25 0.13 0.12
g. --- 0.36 0.16
h. --- 0.26
Calculations for the firm population based on the assumption of random response.
a ? is Goodman´s und Kruskal´s gamma for ordered variables calculated with STATA6.0; bold type val-
ues are significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level.
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Table 7: Pay differentiation in Labor union contracts (Percentages)
i. „Does your labor contract contain the possibility of reducing pay in recessions?“
No Yes
87.6 12.4
„If so: Did your firm take advantage of this possibil-
ity in 1998/99?“
No Yes
9.9 2.5
ii. „Does your labor contract contain the possibility of reducing pay for new hires?“
No Yes
84.5 15.5
„If so: Did your firm take advantage of this possibil-
ity in 1998/99?“
No Yes
9.6 5.9
iii. „Does your labor contract contain the possibility of reducing pay for hiring long-term unemployed
workers?“
No Yes
89.0 11.0
„If so: Did your firm take advantage of this possibil-
ity in 1998/99?“
No Yes
9.3 1.7
Calculations based on the assumption of random response.
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Table 8: Sample selection, stratification and response
Firm size
Industry
10-19 20-49 50-99 100-199 200-499 500+
1 100 100 100 100 100 100
2 16.1% 16.7% 28.0% 38.8% 47.0% 54.4%
Chemical
3 11 7 11 22 22 28
1 200 200 200 200 200 200
2 3.1% 3.3% 7.2% 11.5% 15.9% 25.5%
Metal- and engine building,
electrical industries
3 22 40 28 44 50 52
1 200 200 200 200 200 200
2 0.8% 1.3% 4.0% 8.7% 16.0% 24.8%
Wholesale and retail trade
3 21 16 28 14 19 29
1 100 100 100 100 100 100
2 14.6% 21.2% 54.0% 59.5% 59.2% 55.3%
Finance and insurance
3 10 6 8 10 23 29
1 250 250 250 250 250 250
2 2.5% 3.9% 10.2% 18.7% 24.9% 38.2%
Firm related services
3 47 37 42 41 20 34
Others a 3 5 6 5 1 4 7
1 Number of firms randomly selected per cell
2 Percent of firm population selected per cell
3 Respondents
a 28 respondents from other industries, selected from a different source.
